This paper examines a high-stakes paradox in aviation safety management: safety reporting systems are widely recognized as essential for proactive hazard identification and organizational learning, yet many aviation employees still hesitate to report hazards, near misses, or system weaknesses. The authors argue that a large part of this hesitation is not merely a technical problem of “having a system,” but a cultural and psychological problem of “whether it is safe, acceptable, and meaningful to use it,” especially in collectivist contexts where loyalty, harmony, and conformity can shape what people are willing to disclose (Kim Quy, Bao & Lam Anh, 2026).
The core research question is not just whether collective culture (collectivism) increases or decreases safety reporting intention, but how it works through layered barriers that block reporting. The study proposes a holistic barrier architecture, distinguishing organizational barriers (strategic-level issues such as weak leadership commitment, poor feedback loops, limited resources or IT infrastructure, and lack of independent third-party trust mechanisms), working environment barriers (local operational conditions such as workload, inefficient procedures, peer pressure, and a “code of silence”), and individual barriers (fear of consequences, lack of trust, macho norms, and uncertainty about what and how to report) (Kim Quy et al., 2026; Jausan et al., 2017). The paper’s conceptual move is to treat these barriers as an interlinked sequence rather than independent “lists,” because in real organizations, upstream failures at the organizational level plausibly cascade into the workplace climate and then into individual hesitations (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
The theoretical backbone combines Hofstede–Triandis collectivism with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). Collectivism is treated at the individual perception level as the degree to which a person prioritizes group goals, harmony, and conformity, and avoids conflict with superiors or peers (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1995; Kim Quy et al., 2026). TPB frames reporting intention as driven by attitudes toward reporting, subjective norms (perceived social pressure), and perceived behavioral control (perceived ease or capability of reporting). The paper’s mechanism claim is that collectivist norms can shape subjective norms (pressure to stay silent to protect group harmony), weaken perceived behavioral control (hierarchy, low psychological safety, limited enabling infrastructure), and distort attitudes (reporting interpreted as disloyalty), thereby materializing as barriers that influence intention (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
Empirically, the study uses a quantitative cross-sectional survey of 626 aviation employees working in air service providers in Vietnam, collected over seven weeks (May–July 2025) via an electronic questionnaire; the sampling approach is purposive plus convenience, using established organizational connections and confidentiality assurances, with a small voucher incentive and screening for incomplete or inconsistent responses (Kim Quy et al., 2026). Measures include a five-item collectivism scale (based on Hofstede and Triandis), three barrier constructs adapted from Jausan et al. (2017) with 5–6 items each, and a five-item safety reporting intention construct operationalized as willingness/readiness to engage with the reporting system (Kim Quy et al., 2026). Translation followed translation/back-translation procedures to preserve meaning across languages (Kim Quy et al., 2026). The analysis uses PLS-SEM (SmartPLS 4.0), with measurement model checks (Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, AVE) and discriminant validity checks (Fornell–Larcker and HTMT, with bootstrapped confidence intervals), then structural model bootstrapping with 5,000 resamples and reporting of path coefficients, R², f², and Q² . If aviation has a “black box,” this study tries to build one for silence.
The results are deliberately more nuanced than a simple “collectivism is bad for reporting” story. First, collectivism significantly increases barriers at all three levels: collectivism is positively associated with organizational barriers (β = 0.626, p < .001), working environment barriers (β = 0.290, p < .001), and individual barriers (β = 0.534, p < .001) (Kim Quy et al., 2026). Second, the hypothesized negative direct effect of collectivism on safety reporting intention is not supported; instead, the direct path is positive (β = 0.174, p = .025), meaning that in this sample collectivism does not directly suppress intention and appears to enhance it (Kim Quy et al., 2026). Third, the serial mediation path is supported: collectivism affects intention through a chain CC → OB → WEB → IB → SRI with a small negative indirect effect (β = −0.024, p = .041) (Kim Quy et al., 2026). This combination implies a push–pull dynamic: collectivist orientations can amplify multi-layer barriers that dampen reporting, while also supporting a direct, potentially pro-social motivational route that increases intention when reporting is framed as collective responsibility and learning rather than individual blame (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
From a model-performance standpoint, the reported R² values for endogenous constructs range from 0.392 to 0.724, and Q² values range from 0.292 to 0.538, suggesting adequate explanatory power and predictive relevance for an exploratory, multi-construct framework (Kim Quy et al., 2026). Effect sizes indicate collectivism has large effects on organizational and individual barriers and a medium effect on working environment barriers, while its direct effect on intention is small (Kim Quy et al., 2026). Practically, this pattern matters because it tells managers where “cultural friction” shows up most strongly: not primarily as people openly disliking reporting, but as barrier layers that make reporting socially costly, procedurally painful, or personally risky.
The paper’s main theoretical contribution is to move beyond treating culture as a direct predictor and instead formalize a mechanism where culture “becomes behavior” through sequential barrier layers, linking collectivism explicitly to TPB components via organizational, workplace, and individual constraints (Kim Quy et al., 2026). It also extends the “holistic barriers” approach by modeling the barriers as interconnected rather than isolated, which better matches how reporting climates actually deteriorate or improve in complex safety-critical systems (Jausan et al., 2017; Kim Quy et al., 2026). Contextually, it adds evidence from Vietnam, a Global South collectivist setting often underrepresented in aviation safety culture studies, and argues that the same cultural trait can facilitate safety aims if organizations design reporting as a collective, loyalty-consistent practice with credible feedback and protection mechanisms (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
Managerially, the implication is that interventions cannot be single-point solutions such as “train employees to report.” The study supports multi-layer redesign: at the organizational level, improve leadership commitment, resourcing, independent trust structures, and feedback loops; at the workplace level, reduce workload and procedural friction and counteract peer-driven silence; at the individual level, reduce fear of consequences, clarify what/how to report, and increase confidence via training and psychologically safe channels, including anonymity where appropriate (Kim Quy et al., 2026). A useful cultural reframing suggested by the logic of the findings is to define reporting as loyalty to the group’s safety and learning, not disloyalty to colleagues. In aviation, the closest thing to silence should be the cabin at cruise, not the reporting channel.
Limitations are openly acknowledged: cross-sectional, self-report, non-probability sampling, potential common method bias, and construct coverage constraints due to relatively short scales; the authors call for longitudinal/experimental approaches, probability-based sampling, stronger procedural remedies (e.g., temporal separation, randomization, reversed items), and leadership-style moderators to clarify when collectivism turns into learning versus silence (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
Mini glossary (key concepts with citations)
Collective culture / collectivism refers to a value orientation where people define themselves through group membership and prioritize harmony, loyalty, unity, and conformity, often avoiding open confrontation, especially with superiors. In this study, collectivism is measured as perceived norms at the individual level, not merely a country label (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
Safety reporting intention is an employee’s willingness and readiness to engage with the safety reporting system, reflecting whether they are inclined to report hazards, near misses, or safety concerns in their organization (Kim Quy et al., 2026). It is treated as a behavioral-intention construct consistent with intention-based models such as TPB (Ajzen, 1991).
Safety reporting barriers are obstacles that discourage or prevent employees from reporting safety concerns; this study uses a three-level taxonomy: organizational barriers (strategic and system-level constraints), working environment barriers (local climate and operational constraints), and individual barriers (personal fear, knowledge gaps, trust and confidence issues) (Jausan et al., 2017; Kim Quy et al., 2026).
Serial mediation means a causal-path logic where one variable influences an outcome through a sequence of mediators in a specific order. Here, collectivism affects safety reporting intention through organizational barriers, which shape working environment barriers, which then shape individual barriers, producing a chained indirect effect (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) explains intention as shaped by attitudes (evaluation of the behavior), subjective norms (perceived social expectations), and perceived behavioral control (perceived ability and ease of performing the behavior) (Ajzen, 1991). The paper interprets reporting barriers as practical expressions of constrained control and normative pressure in collectivist settings (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
PLS-SEM (partial least squares structural equation modeling) is a variance-based SEM approach often used for prediction-oriented, complex models with multiple latent constructs; it evaluates measurement reliability/validity and tests structural paths, commonly using bootstrapping for inference (Kim Quy et al., 2026).
References
Main Source: Kim Quy, H. T., Bao, V. H., & Lam Anh, T. D. (2026). Collective culture and safety reporting intention: The serial mediation of safety reporting barriers. Safety Science, 196, 107077. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2025.107077
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T
Jausan, M., Silva, J., & Sabatini, R. (2017). A holistic approach to evaluating the effect of safety barriers on the performance of safety reporting systems in aviation organisations. Journal of Air Transport Management, 63, 95–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2017.06.004