In “Scrutinizing Justice in Sociology: Inspiration From Social Psychology,” Karen A. Hegtvedt, a distinguished professor of sociology at Emory University and former coeditor of Social Psychology Quarterly, presents a compelling argument for a deeper and more precise conceptualization of justice within sociological scholarship. Drawing inspiration from the complex reflections on law and justice by Judge Bertram Schmitt of the International Criminal Court, Hegtvedt underscores that “Justice has to be seen to be done”. She critically examines the extent to which sociologists engage with justice and whether they conceptualize it clearly.
Hegtvedt addresses three pivotal questions through her analysis:
- Do sociologists attend to justice in their scholarly work? Based on a five-year review (2018–22) of publications in three American Sociological Association (ASA) journals (American Sociological Review, Social Psychology Quarterly, and Journal of Health and Social Behavior), Hegtvedt concludes, “not so much”. While sociologists extensively study inequality (e.g., about 39% of ASR articles reference inequality in the text), they less frequently move to subjective assessments of injustice.
- When sociologists do attend to justice, do they conceptualize it clearly? Hegtvedt’s answer is “not really”. She highlights that definitions often rely on synonyms like “fairness” or “equity” without precise conceptualization. For example, terms like “health equity” are often used interchangeably with “health inequalities” or “health disparities,” leading to conceptual ambiguity.
- Could social-psychology-of-justice scholarship further contribute to sociologists’ attention to and clarity of conceptualization and understanding of social phenomena? Hegtvedt unequivocally states, “yes”. She advocates for leveraging existing social psychological conceptualizations and research to enhance the “seeing justice” process in sociological domains like health, education, ethnoracial dynamics, and the environment.
The article emphasizes the importance of understanding the three core types of justice:
- Distributive justice pertains to the fairness of outcomes or rewards.
- Procedural justice concerns the fairness of decision-making processes, emphasizing principles like voice, impartiality, and accuracy.
- Interactional justice focuses on the fairness of interpersonal treatment, highlighting respect, dignity, and kindness.
Hegtvedt illustrates how these justice processes operate across micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis, particularly within the health domain. She demonstrates how micro-level patient-provider interactions, meso-level organizational dynamics in hospitals, and macro-level health policies are all permeated by justice concerns. For instance, implicit racial bias in patient-provider interactions can violate both interactional and procedural justice, contributing to health inequalities. Similarly, the distribution of COVID-19 vaccine sites in marginalized communities exemplifies distributive injustice at the meso level.
This address reinforces the points made by former Cooley-Mead award winners regarding the importance of clear conceptualization and micro-meso-macro connections, and it echoes the unfulfilled call of past ASA presidents for translating scholarly work to policy and action. Ultimately, Hegtvedt argues that applying rigorous conceptual, theoretical, and empirical tools from the social psychology of justice can bridge the gap between studying objective inequalities and understanding subjective perceptions of injustice, thereby enabling societal change and advancing theorizing in both sociology and social psychology.
Reference:
Hegtvedt, K. A. (2024). Scrutinizing justice in sociology: Inspiration from social psychology. Social Psychology Quarterly, 87(2), 111–130.
